Managing the public during the nipah virus outbreak in Negeri Sembilan by ﻿Ramlee R.,
Buletin Kesihatan Masyarakat Isu Khas 2000                                                            69
MANAGING THE PUBLIC DURING THE NIPAH VIRUS
OUTBREAK IN NEGERI SEMBILAN
Ramlee R..*
INTRODUCTION
The first Nipah virus outbreak was detected in Negeri Sembilan on 4th January 1999.
It all started in Kampung Dato' Wong Seng Chow, Sikamat, in the district of
Seremban. The outbreak was then identified as Japanese Encephalitis (JE).
The machinery for control of JE was mobilised as soon as the outbreak in
Perak was reported. That was done as early as 20th October 1998 with the collection
of baseline data of all  pig farms in the state. The state was put on alert and health
education materials were produced and distributed.
Among the communication challenges faced in controlling the outbreak were
issues related to the handling of the pig farmers, workers, general public, the mass
media, the encephalitis cases and their family members, non govermental
organisations (NGO), health-care workers and other personels involved.
THE FARMERS AND WORKERS
The pig farms in Bukit Pelanduk area, coded BP I for Bukit Pelanduk I (Bukit
Pelanduk II (BP II), coded for Sepang), Port Dickson, were different that those found
in Perak and Seremban District. The farms in Perak were located in fruit orchards
and the farmers and their workers did not stay in the farms. The farms in Seremban
were well organised, fenced with living quarters for the workers within the farms
with the farmers or owners staying elsewhere.  The farms have proper drainage
system for waste water from the pigsty to oxidation ponds before being discharged
into the river
Unlike the farms in Perak and Seremban, the farms in BP I were scattered
within oil palm estates, with no proper fences and no proper drainage system. Waste
water from the pigsty drain straight into small drains that flow finally into the river.
The rearing of pigs in BP I is likened to the rearing of chicken in coops at the back of
houses, but in this case, pig farms. The farmers and their family literally stayed in the
pig farms. The workers came from the village or neighbouring villages. The nearest
house of a neighbour - not a pig farmer - could be a few metres away. The exceptions
were some huge farms which rear pigs for export and were well organised therefore
did not have living quarters within the farms.  Otherwise pig farming was a family
business where all family mambers were involved.  Even the children assist
occasionally during the school holidy.
During the initial stage of the outbreak, vaccination for JE was promoted.
Other  measures  such as  dialogues,  lectures,  talks on radio,  public  announcements
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through putting up posters and distribution of pamphlets were well on the way.
Pertaining to the JE vaccination, the response was overwhelming, especially in
Seremban.  At the initial stage, the supply of vaccine was somewhat limited.  We had
to limit the number of recipients to be able to carry on with the subsequent doses.
However, as the outbreak progresses, the number that turned out for the 3rd dose was
much less. During home visits to trace the 3rd  dose defaulters, it was found that there
were no such persons in the addresses given and could not be traced. There was a
possibility that others took the opportunity of the free vaccination.
In BP I, there was a huge demamd for JE vaccination. So much so that
dialogue sessions were boycotted by the farmers unless vaccination was given. Such
an incident happened on 3rd December 1998 where a dialogue session for farmers
were organised in Bukit Pelanduk. Only 15 turned up for the dialogue.
Besides BP I and BP II, terms like Priority I and Priority II, were also used.
Priority I, were pig farmers and those staying inside the farms. Priority II were those
staying outside the farms but within 2 kilometres from the farm. Vaccination policies
for the 2 priority areas were different. People in Priority I were given 4 doses at day
0, day 7, day 30 and 1 year. Whereas those in Priority II were given 3 doses - day 0,
day 7 and 1 year.
But the residents in BP I, were unhappy about double standard. The reason
being that the houses in BP I, were very near to the pig farms and not much different
to the farmers staying inside the farms. Other than that, the residents were given
explanation on the effectiveness of the vaccine at different doses, the delay in
response of the immune system and protection were not 100%. A decision was made
to give everyone 4 doses irrespective whether they were in Priority I or Priority II
areas.   It was meart to defuse the residents unhappiness on the double standard for
the vaccination doses and these residents can be considered as staying in Priority I
area.
But it did not stop there. The real problem cropped when the deaths kept on
climbing despite the vaccination to the farmers. Among those who died, have
received 1, 2 and even 3 doses. This led to distrust on the vaccine by the farmers and
workers, and they even questioned the actions taken by the government. The farmers
began to believe that the outbreak was not JE, but something else. They daringly
wandered in the town watching fogging activities in their shorts and short sleeve
shirts or singlets in contrast to the fully protected foggers. This led to the refusal of
vaccination by the farmers, workers and the residents. They strongly believed that the
vaccine reduced the body's resistance and those who received the 2nd or 3rd dose can
die from the vaccine. Therefore efforts were made to encourage the farmers to
complete their vaccination.
During the registration of farmers organised by the MCA in Lukut, a clinic
was set up beside the registration counter. Announcements were made over and over
again to get the farmers to complete their vaccination. Talks was given to the crowd
to explain the purpose of the vaccine but to all vain. Of the hundreds that came for
registration, only 6 people came forward to enquire on the vaccination and only 3
agreed for  vaccination.
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With the increase in deaths, the farmers started to abandon their farms.  One of
the main reasons that, the feed millers refused to continue credit to the farmers.
Therefore the pigs started to die of hunger. The pigs themselves cannot be sold either
live or as meat. The sale of pork dropped tremendously. The only option left was  to
kill the pigs. Out of despration, some farmers surrendered their pigs voluntary to the
Veterinary Department for destruction.  The Veterinary Department also made an
effort to get the farmers to voluntarily surrender their pigs for destruction. Some of
the farmers fled, leaving their pigs behind.  As a result,  the pigs escaped from the
farms and started roaming the town, villages and oil palm estates looking for food.  It
was reported that pig carcasses were found in houses and bedrooms of the area.
The government agreed to give financial assistance of RM 50.00 for each pig
killed irrespective of age and size. For each pig killed and buried voluntarily, an
additional RM 3.00 were offered. These were incentives to persuade farmers to kill
their own pigs. So the NGO organised the culling operations.  These workers were
advised to put on protective clothing every time they handle the pigs. Posters were
posted on the farms on proper personal protection such as overalls, mask, goggles,
gloves and boots. Unfortunately a few of the workers did not comply. They gave
reasons that it is uncomfortable, too hot, too slippery to handle the pigs, protective
clothing not supplied and some refused to wear even though they were threatened
with legal action.
THE RESIDENTS
The residents were those categorised staying in Priority II areas. Frankly, these
people were staying just outside the pig farms. The boundary for Priority I and
Priority II was too vague for BP I.
They were advised to take precaution against being bitten by the Culex
mosquitoes such as wearing long sleeve shirt, long pants, applying mosquito
repellents, using wire mesh on windows, mosquito repellents in the house, staying
indoors after dusk and cleaning up mosquito breeding areas around their houses.
They were also advised for vaccination. Health education activities continued.
School attendance started to decline, especially when the farmers started to
leave their farms and homes. Talks were given to teachers and students in the
schools. In addition to talks, fogging was also carried out in the schools. Still the
attendance declined and have to be closed temporarily. The students were sent to
other schools in Lukut. Businesses started to decline and shops were closed. Most
were closed, but due to the stench of decaying carcasses from the abandoned farms,
not out of fear of the desease.
With respect to JE vaccine, the residents in Priority II areas too refused
vaccination. The Malays staying next door to the farms questioned on the religious
fatwa' of the vaccine. Although a fatwa' was released by the Negeri Sembilan Mufti'
on the religious stand of the vaccination, the Malays were not convinced. A Friday
sermon was held by the Mufti' at the mosque in BP 1 area touched on the issue of
vaccination and its fatwa.  However the Malays still refused vaccination.
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Efforts to encourage the Malays to complete their vaccination were carried out
with the assistance ofa  group of 40 officers from the Department of Information. The
team combined with the health teams and visited from house to house to convince the
Malays to complete their vaccination but with little success.   However the Malays in
the other distant villages within 2 kilometre radius responded well to the vaccination
campaign.
THE CASES AND THEIR FAMILIES
As the encephalitis cases started to increase, Hospital Seremban swung into full
action. During the initial outbreak, the cases were treated as JE. There were no
presumed risk transmission to the hospital staff. The cases were treated in the general
medical wards. As nipah virus came into the picture, universal precaution were taken.
Two wards were converted to specially cater for the Nipah virus encephalitis. Family
members and relatives were satisfied with the management of the cases in the
hospital. They were kept informed on the status of the cases. The operations room
was opened which also catered for requests on status of patients. Close family
members were allowed to wait outside the wards with hospital volunteers also
assisting in keeping the family members comfortable besides consoling them.
THE MASS MEDIA
The State Health Department had a good relationship with the mass media. The
Department kept them up to date on health matters pertaining to the state. During this
crisis, the Department was required to refer to the headquarters first before making
statement to the press. But most of the time, the press called by telephone and
expected immediate response, which was not possible since the state need to get
clearance from the headquarters. It was suggested that the State Health Department
be permitted to release statements on activities done at state level, leaving statements
related to national policies to the headquarters.
During the initial outbreak, the State Health Department was releasing
information on the activities carried to the press. The 'Gag Order' stopped State
Health Department from releasing information to the media. The media have no other
option except to get it from the Ministry of Health headquarters. Because of this, the
mass media gave conflicting reports on the number of cases and it created uneasiness
among the general public, leading to accusations of government cover-ups. The
media did come to the State Health operations room to enquire on the actual figures,
but their request were turned down due to the ‘Gag Order’.  The mass media have
other ways of getting the news.  They approached family members and their relatives
for news.
Besides the local media, the foreign media too tried to get on site where the
activities were going on. But they were denied permission. They however still
manage to get news but from the farmers and politicians.
The dissemination of statistics of the outbreak through the ministry’s
homepage(dph.gov.my) was an excellent idea. But that was not enough. The press
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wanted more, and they kept calling the State Health Operations room for more
informationbut was turned down every time.
Therefore a regular briefing to the press is suggested at the headquarters level,
daily if necessary, to reduce uncalled for accusations and to give the latest update on
strategies of activities done.
At one of the culling operations done in a pig farm in Mambau, Seremban, the
State Task Force invited the mass media to observe and record the whole operation.
Therefore the mass media had a clear picture of how the activity was conducted and
that killing was done humely.
THE EVACUEES
The evacuation of BP I residents were done for several reasons. The farmers and
their family members abandoned their farms for fear of their lives. The residents also
evacuated their houses due to the unbearable stench. Some farmers were advised to
evacuate to avoid stray bullets during the culling operations. The majority of the
Indian and Malay community in Kg. India, Bukit Pelandok and neighbouring villages
did not evacuate their homes.  They remained in their home, even though their sense
were assaulted by the slench of the carcass.  The main reason for not leaving were
that they did not have a place to go and they could not afford to rent houses in other
place.
The farmers stayed in rented houses in Lukut. The other evacuees, mainly
Indians were relocated temporarily in Sekolah Kebangsaan Tanah Merah. The
welfare of the evacuees in the school were managed by the Welfare Department.
Classrooms were converted into living quarters. Drinking water was supplied by the
Waterworks Department and food was catered. Portable toilets were provided by Port
Dickson Local Council to supplement the existing toilets. With the reopening of the
school, the evacuees were relocated to the Port Dickson old hospital. The wards were
partitioned to accommodate the families. Food was prepared by the Red Crescent.
The problem with the evacuation centres was that there were no privacy. However,
the evacuees were mobilised to keep the place clean and helped the Red Crescent in
serving the food. The local Indian community leaders finally relocated the evacuees
in rented houses in Taman Timah Jaya,Lukut.
Health education  continued at the school and the Port Dickson old hospital,
with posters and distribution of pamphlets.
NON GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS
The non-government organisation (NGO) assisted in the control of the outbreak. The
Pig Farmers Association bought their own fogging machines and formed their own
teams. But the areas fogged were determined by themselves, mainly their own
premises.  The Malay villages also received some fogging machines from the State
Government. They too formed teams to fog their villages. Both these groups were
given technical advice on fogging procedures and maintenance of the fogging
machine.
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HEALTH PERSONNEL
The initial control measures were directed towards control of JE. The health
personnel on the field were informed on the mode of transmission of JE, and had
been briefed on protective measures they have to take during the fogging, larviciding
and health education activities. They were also given JE vaccination.
But the problem appeared when Nipah Virus encephalitis came into the
picture. Would the JE vaccine be needed since the outbreak was something else? The
situation was made worsened when the public started to refused vaccination. There
were several reasons why the vaccination was continued. The first reason was to
avoid wastage. The first dose gave no protection at all. Without the following doses
the first dose already given would be wasted. The second reason was that JE was still
being detected together with Nipah Virus encephalitis. Thus the JE vaccine would
still protect the residents from getting JE. The personnel giving vaccination was
facing a difficult task in explaining to the public on the need of the JE vaccine.
Furthermore, they were well aware they were facing an unknown disease.
There was not much that could be told to the health personnel, except to take all
safety precautions and not to touch anything in the pig farm during their fogging
operations. It was fortunate that they were already wearing full protective gear during
the JE control operations which served well for the Nipah Virus outbreak. Additional
measures taken were footbaths to disinfect their boots and their protective clothing
were laundered.
All personnel involved in the culling operations were briefed daily at their
base where they report for duties. They were reminded to protect themselves
everyday before embarking on their daily activities.
Another issue that cropped up was on the need for fogging even though the
outbreak was not JE. Fogging was however continued since there were no change in
policy on fogging. The fogging served as a confidence booster for the pig cullers.
Communication gadget was a problem among the field workers, especially the
foggers. Each team would have a policeman equipped with walkie talkie. But due to
the intensiveness of the activities, the equipment was inadequate. It is suggested that
for the future, walkie talkies be made available in times of crises for effective
management of the health resources in the field.
CONCLUSION
The management of the public during such crisis was as important as controlling the
outbreak itself. If the public was not managed well, the control activities would have
been futile. Lessons learnt from this outbreak should be consolidated to improve on
public management in future crises.
